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The China 301 on Market Access:
A Prelude to GATT Membership?
Patrick H. Hu
In the last fifteen years' there has been a rapid expansion of
trade between the United States and the People's Republic of
China. 2 Difficulties, however, have arisen from time to time be-
tween the two nations, prompting the U.S. government to
threaten China with trade sanctions. 3 While there are several
relevant political and economic issues,4 this Note focuses on U.S.
application of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 19745 in dealing
1. On January 1, 1979, the United States and China normalized their bi-
lateral relationship pursuant to the Joint Communique on the Establishment of
Diplomatic Relations. See Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplo-
matic Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Repub-
lic of China, Jan. 1, 1979, 79 DEPT ST. BULL., Jan. 1979, at 25. Soon thereafter,
on July 7, 1979, the United States and China signed an Agreement on Trade
Relations. See Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of
America and the People's Republic of China, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 31
U.S.T. 4651.
2. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR), trade between the United States and China has increased from $2.4
billion in 1979 to $33.2 billion in 1992, at an average of more than 100 percent
annually for the past 13 years. See OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., 1986 NATIONAL
TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARmRIs (1986) at 63 [hereinafter
1986 NTE REPORT]; OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., 1993 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERs (1993) at 49 [hereinafter 1993 NTE
REPORT].
3. For example, the United States has threatened China with sanctions in
response to some of China's sale of arms and its purported use of prison labor.
For a summary of U.S. economic sanctions specifically in the case of China, see
MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 194-97, 639-44
(1990).
4. The most controversial issue is the annual presidential renewal of
most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status to China. While this debate centers
on political issues such as human rights, its underlying impact on bilateral
trade relations cannot be ignored. For a background summary of China's MFN
status, see Lucille A. Barale, U.S. MFN Renewal for China: The Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, 12 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 6 (1990), available in LEXIS, ITRADE li-
brary, EASIAN File. See also infra note 25 and accompanying text.
5. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. III, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041
(codified as amended 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)). Congress enacted the 1974
Trade Act for the purpose of fostering the economic growth of, and full employ-
ment in, the United States and strengthening economic relations between the
United States and foreign countries through open and nondiscriminatory world
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with China's allegedly unfair trade practices. The U.S. govern-
ment has initiated two Section 301 actions against China, and
both actions have culminated in a memorandum of understand-
ing on specific trade issues.6
The basic objective of Section 301 is to provide the United
States with the leverage necessary to negotiate agreements with
foreign countries which resolve trade disputes and, thus, open
foreign markets to U.S. firms.7 Section 301 gives the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) both mandatory and dis-
cretionary authority to respond to unfair trade acts, policies, or
practices by any foreign government.8 The USTR has
trade. 21A AM. JuR. 2D Customs Duties, etc. § 20 (1981). Other purposes of the
1974 Trade Act relevant to Section 301 include harmonizing, reducing, and
eliminating barriers to trade on a basis which assures substantially equivalent
competitive opportunities for U.S. commerce; establishing fairness and equity
in international trading relations, including reform of the GATT; and opening
up market opportunities for U.S. commerce in non-market countries. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2102 (1988). For easy reference, actions taken under these statutory provi-
sions are commonly referred to as "Section 301" actions.
6. The two actions taken were the "Special 301" investigation on intellec-
tual property protection and the Section 301 investigation on market access.
Both actions resulted in the signing of a memorandum of understanding on the
resolution of specific trade issues. See Memorandum of Understanding between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
People's Republic of China on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17,
1992, available in WESTLAW, USTREATISES Library, TREATY File; People's
Republic of China-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Market Access, Oct. 10, 1992, 31 LL.M. 1274 [hereinafter MOU].
This Note focuses only on the Section 301 action relating to market access
of U.S. exports to China and the resulting MOU. For a discussion of the "Spe-
cial 301" action and the resulting MOU on intellectual property protection in
China see generally Xiao-Lin Zhou, U.S.-China Trade Dispute and China's In-
tellectual Property Rights Protection, 24 N.Y.U. INT'L LAW & POL. 1115 (1992).
In addition, for a detailed analysis of and a practical approach to the current
status of intellectual property protection in China, see Richard L. Thurston,
Country Risk Management: China and Intellectual Property Protection, 27 INTVL
L. 51-64 (1993).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3XB). The Congress intended to allow the USTR to
.speak with a loud, clear voice" in negotiating agreements with foreign coun-
tries to resolve trade disputes. 134 CONG. REc. § 10,672 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1988).
The transfer of authority from the President to the USTR to negotiate agree-
ments "strengthens the negotiating authority and credibility of the USTR."
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POL-
ICY REFORM AcT OF 1987: REPor TO AccoMPANY H.R. 3, H.R. REP No. 40, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1987).
8. 19 U.S.C. § 2411. The original provisions of the current Section 301
were enacted as part of the 1974 Trade Act, giving the President discretionary
authority to retaliate against unfair trade practices by foreign countries. See 19
U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985). It also gave the President ex-
traordinary "negotiating leverage" to ensure compliance by foreign govern-
ments with trade agreements and to eliminate trade restrictions and other
CHINA 301
mandatory authority to take action if the rights of the United
States under a trade agreement are denied, or if the trade prac-
tices of any foreign government are "unjustifiable and burden or
restrict United States commerce." 9 The USTR also has discre-
tionary authority to take action against a foreign country's acts,
policies, or practices that are "unreasonable or discriminatory
and burden or restrict United States commerce."' 0 In resolving
the market access dispute, the USTR utilized its discretionary
authority under Section 30111 and entered into the Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MOU) with China. 12
barriers. See SENATE FINANCE Comm. REP. ON THE TRADE REFORM Acr OF 1974,
S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 164, 167-168 (1974). Following the 1979
and 1984 amendments (Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901,
93 Stat. 144 (1979); Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 304,
307(b), 98 Stat. 2948 (1984)), the 1988 amendment (the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988)) dele-
gated the Section 301 authority further to the USTR, mandated the USTR to
retaliate against violations of trade agreements or unjustifiable acts by foreign
countries, created various versions of Section 301 actions, and expanded the list
of unreasonable practices actionable under Section 301. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
Section 301 as amended is the major U.S. trade law designed to "pry open
foreign markets to U.S. investment and exports of goods and services, and to
achieve adequate and effective protection abroad for intellectual property
rights." See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act:
A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2
(1988). Although the United States has rarely exercised its ultimate authority
of retaliatory sanctions under the 301 provisions, the mere threat of using them
has given the United States tremendous bargaining power in settling disputed
trade issues. See Jean Heilman Grier, The Use of Section 301 to Open Japanese
Markets to Foreign Firms, 17 N.C. J. INVL L. & COM. REG. 1, 4-10 (1992).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1). An act, policy, or practice is unjustifiable if it is
"in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United
States." Id. § 2411(dX4Xa). "Acts, policies and practices that are discrimina-
tory include, when appropriate, any act, policy or practice which denies na-
tional or most-favored-nation treatment to United States goods, services, or
investment." Id. § 2411(dX5).
Congressional debate over the 1988 amendment to Section 301 reflected
legislative efforts to strengthen the statutory authority by mandating retalia-
tion to the violation of, or denial of U.S. benefits under, a trade agreement. See
Bello & Holmer, supra note 8, at 10-18.
10. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1). An act, policy, or practice of a foreign govern-
ment is unreasonable if it, inter alia, denies "fair and equitable market opportu-
nities, including the toleration by a foreign government of systematic
anticompetitive activities by private firms or among private firms in the foreign
country that have the effect of restricting, on a basis that is inconsistent with
commercial considerations, access of United States goods to purchasing by such
firms." Id. § 2411(dX3)(B)(i)(III).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
12. The authority which the USTR used to reach the MOU with China is
expressly provided in the statute. With the leverage under either the
mandatory or discretionary authority of Section 301, the USTR is empowered
1994] 133
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The China 301 is unique in its dual purpose of resolving
short-term trade issues for the United States and promoting
long-term economic reform in China. In furtherance of this dual
purpose, the USTR's goal was to reach a plausible trade agree-
ment, the MOU, which would serve as a legal framework for
China's long-term reform.13 Within this framework, China has
committed to an overall reform of its trade system in exchange
for a commitment by the United States to "staunchly support"14
China's efforts to become a member of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).15 Nevertheless, the United States
was prepared to take immediate corrective action if the negotia-
to: (1) stop fulfilling trade agreement obligations to the country concerned, (2)
impose import restrictions on products from that country, or (3) enter into bind-
ing agreements which commit the country in violation to eliminate its unjustifi-
able or unreasonable trade practices and provide the United States with
compensatory trade benefits. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c).
13. The purpose of this strategy is to "underpin the [trade] relationship
with a framework based on the rule of law." Lee M. Sands and Deborah M.
Lehr, Expanding Trade and Opening Markets in China, 20 CHINA Bus. REv. 10,
11 (1993).
14. Id. See also MOU, supra note 6, at 1279.
15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
China was one of the original twenty-three Contracting Parties to the GATT
when it came into force under the Protocol of Provisional Application in 1948.
In 1950, after the founding of the People's Republic of China on the mainland,
the Nationalist government in Taiwan sent a cable to the GATT Secretariat
withdrawing China's membership. Thereafter, the Taiwan government took an
observer position in GATT from 1965 to 1971. China has not had its Con-
tracting Party status since 1950. Wenguo Cai, China's GATT Membership: Se-
lected Legal and Political Issues, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 35, 36-37 (1992). China
argues that the withdrawal in 1950 was invalid because it was from a govern-
ment not then in control of China. China's current position is that its GATT
membership should be resumed because its membership in other major interna-
tional organizations, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary
Fund, and the World Bank, has been activated. In the early 1980s, China be-
came an observer and joined the GATT MultiFiber Arrangement. Id. at 59. In
July 1986, China formally submitted its GATT application and requested a
working party to consider conditions for its membership. Negotiations for
China's GATT membership have focused on the requirements under GATT Ar-
ticle XXXIII. Id. China has recently stated that it will not rush to rejoin GATT
if conditions are not ripe. See China Said to Scale Down Expectation of Early
Accession to Gatt, Sources Said, Intl Trade Daily (BNA), Aug. 16, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, ITRADE Library, BNAITD File.
For further discussion on China and GATT, see Cai, supra at 35 (1992);
Robert E. Herzstein, China and the GATT: Legal and Policy Issues Raised by
China's Participation in GATT, 18 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 371 (1986); Chung-
Chou Li, Resumption of China's GATT Membership, 21 J. WORLD TRADE 25
(1987); Peter C. Sheridan, The Accession to GATT of the People's Republic of
China: New Challenges for the World Trading Regime, 23 WrLmAumE L. REv.
843 (1987).
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tions failed. 16 This strategy was unprecedented as it addressed
U.S. trade grievances with China by accommodating China's
needs to ultimately conform with the world economy. To fully
understand the China 301, it is important to look beyond both
the mechanics of the 301 action and its impact on the bilateral
relationship between the United States and China.' 7
This Note examines the significance of the China 301 on
market access. Part I identifies the disputed issues, the justifi-
cations of the United States for bringing the action, and China's
reactions. Part II illustrates how GATT principles guided the
resolution of trade issues in the MOU. Part III evaluates the
implementing process of the MOU and assesses the MOU's sig-
nificance in a future China-GATT relationship. The Note con-
cludes that the MOU, and the 301 negotiations that led to its
signing, should serve as a model for dispute settlement during
the initial period of China's GATT membership.
I. THE MARKET ACCESS DISPUTE
The 301 action against China on market access officially
commenced on October 10, 1991 and ended one year later on Oc-
16. The USTR was "fully prepared to deny China access to portions of the
lucrative U.S. market if [the] agreement had not been reached." Sands & Lehr,
supra note 13, at 11. See also Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., Proposed Determinations
Regarding Certain Market Access Barriers of the People's Republic of China:
Request for Public Comment and Public Hearing, 57 Fed. Reg. 38,912 and ann.
(Aug. 27, 1992)[hereinafter Proposed Determinations].
17. There has been no literature on this topic thus far. However, some
practitioners have recently addressed the relevant U.S.-China trade issues. For
a background report of the two 301 actions against China, see Lucille Barale,
Section 301 Investigations: Using U.S. Laws to Address China's Unfair Trade
Practices, 13 E. AsIAN ExEc. REP. 9 (1991), available in LEXIS, ITRADE Li-
brary, EASIAN File. Barale's article was written soon after the USTR initiated
the 301 action on market access and almost a year before the action was suc-
cessfully concluded in October 1992. The author opined that 301 actions were
unavoidable if the U.S. government was going to save China's MFN status, the
foundation for the bilateral trade relations. Id. For a discussion of China's
MFN status in connection with its future GATT membership, See T.K Chang,
After China Joins the GATT: Will It Continue to Face Annual MFN Renewal
Battles? 15 E. ASIAN ExEc. REP. 9 (1993) available in LEXIS, ITRADE Library,
EASIAN File. Chang calls for the legislative modification or abolishment of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment (the statutory authority for presidential grant of
MFN to China) after China joins the GATT in order for the United States to
continue to advocate the universal application of GAT principles to all nations
without exception. Id. For a summary of U.S.-China trade issues in general, see
Jan Pryblya, How Should U.S. Handle Trade Issues With China? 15 E. AsIAN
ExEc. REP. 9 (1993), available in LEXIS, ITRADE Library, EASIAN File.
1994]
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tober 10, 1992.18 Throughout the entire course of the 301 action,
the bilateral negotiations were characterized by an active ex-
change of views and a mutual desire to resolve disputed issues.
China resisted unilateral action by the United States in princi-
ple, but also wanted to seek the long term benefits of economic
reform by reaching a trade agreement with the United States.
The USTR, on the other hand, exercised its 301 authority cogni-
zant of the unique circumstances created by China's economic
reform. An understanding of the United States' reasons for
bringing the 301 action, and China's response to the issues
raised by the United States, is necessary in order to understand
how the two countries eventually reconciled their differences. 19
A. THE TRIGGERING ISSUE OF TRADE IMBALANCE
The trade imbalance between the United States and China
has been increasing at an unprecedented rate. The United
States had a $10.4 billion trade deficit with China in 199020 and
an $18 billion trade deficit in 1992.21 It is estimated that the
deficit will increase 30 percent to between $23 and $24 billion in
1993.22 Members of the U.S. Congress and the general public
have become increasingly concerned about U.S. trade policy
with China.23 Not surprisingly, the increase in Chinese exports
18. For a history of the Section 301 action against China on market access
issues, see infra Appendix - Chronology of Events.
19. In principle, China was opposed to Section 301, but was pragmatic
enough to be flexible. Both sides realized that they had strong mutual economic
interests and that their hard-earned relationship should be preserved and pro-
moted. This mutual understanding allowed the USTR to follow the strategy of
balancing the short-term need to eliminate unfair trade practices that Section
301 was designed to combat with the long-term goal of promoting U.S.-China
relations. The agreement the two countries finally reached demonstrates that
the fundamental quid pro quo for China's commitment to reform its trade poli-
cies is the United States' support for China's reentry into GATT. See, Cai
Shikuan & Zhang Yijun, Li Peng Meets U.S. Commerce Secretary: Hoping for
U.S. Support on China's GAYT Status, PEoPLE's DAILY, Dec. 19, 1992, at 1
(available in Chinese). During a meeting between Premier Li Ping and Com-
merce Secretary Barbara Franklin, Premier Li Ping expressed the hope that
the United States would make practical efforts to support China's original con-
tracting party status in GATT. Li promised that as soon as this status is re-
sumed, China's market would become more open. Id.
20. See OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., 1990 NATIONAL TRADE EsrmATE REPORT
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 43 (1991).
21. See 1993 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 49.
22. See U.S. Gives China Until End of Year to Prove Adherence to Market
Access Pact, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1975 (Oct. 27, 1993) (Statement by Dep-
uty U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky).
23. Barale, supra note 17, at 9.
136 [Vol. 3:131
1994] CHINA 301
to the United States has resulted in increasing complaints from
American manufacturers. 24
Although China is a developing country and a nonmarket
economy, it has received most-favored-nation (MFN) trading
status from the United States since 1980,25 and this nondiscrim-
inatory treatment has contributed, at least in part, to the fact
that China has the fastest-growing economy in the world. De-
spite the import benefits that the United States has been giving
to China,26 U.S. exports to China generally face restricted ac-
cess to the Chinese market,27 far from the level of access that
Chinese goods enjoy in the United States.28 This unequal access
was highlighted by the record-breaking deficit from 1990 to
1992,29 and prompted the U.S. government to take unilateral ac-
tion under Section 301.30
China's governmental measures to control its overheated
economy also contributed to the trade imbalance with the
United States. Such measures included import restrictions. Af-
ter September 1988, China pursued an economic retrenchment
policy to address its overwhelming economic problems which in-
clude high inflation, budget deficits, falling productivity, and in-
creasing foreign debt.31 In the meantime, China became more
24. Petitions have been filed with the U.S. Department of Commerce and
the International Trade Commission requesting that antidumping duties be im-
posed on various Chinese products because the non-market Chinese economy is
centrally planned and prices on inputs may be set by the state. Id. at 9 n.2.
25. For a summary of the legal background surrounding the annual presi-
dential renewal of MFN to China, see Barale, supra note 4. President Clinton
has recently renewed China's MFN status with conditions for human rights im-
provement in China. President Clinton Extends MFN to China, But Sets Condi-
tions on Renewal Next Year, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 886 (Jun. 2, 1993).
26. The U.S. market is more open to imports from China than is that of the
European Community, Japan, or any other industrialized country. See Sands
& Lehr, supra note 13, at 10. For example, except for textiles, Chinese goods
are not subject to formidable U.S. standards or non-tariff barriers. Id.
27. At the time of the signing of the MOU, U.S. access to the Chinese mar-
ket was limited by a wide range of import restrictions, import licensing require-
ments, and import standards and certification requirements. These were the
major areas targeted by the USTR's 301 investigation. See Off. of U.S. Trade
Rep., Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment:
Barriers to Access to the Market of the People's Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg.
51,943 (Oct. 16, 1991). While the entire action is authorized under Section 301,
the actual authority to initiate investigation is provided in Section 302. 19
U.S.C. § 2412.
28. See Sands & Lehr, supra note 13, at 10.
29. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
31. On September 30, 1988, the Chinese Communist Party's Thirteenth
Central Committee, 3rd Plenary Session, promulgated an economic retrench-
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dependent on exports for economic growth, and accumulated for-
eign exchange reserves.32 This development renewed China's
economic growth by reducing its import levels. 33 Consequently,
in 1991 China had a $12.7 billion trade surplus with the United
States.34
Three justifications put forth by China for its trade surplus
with the United States are worth noting.35 First, U.S. rules of
origin categorize transshipment from Hong Kong and other re-
gions as Chinese imports, resulting in a significant discrepancy
in statistics.36 Further, China contends that Chinese raw
materials processed in Hong Kong should not be counted as Chi-
nese exports.37 Finally, many companies in Taiwan and Hong
Kong, attracted by the cheap labor costs in China, transferred
their production to China. Most of the end products were then
ment policy in order to reorganize China's economy, which was strained by the
unprecedented rate of inflation. See 528 XINHUA MONTHLY 5 n.10 (1988) (avail-
able in Chinese). On November 19, 1989, the 5th Plenary Session of the Party's
Thirteenth Central Committee further promoted the retrenchment policy by
stressing reorganization in the areas of (1) balancing social demand with sup-
ply, (2) falling agricultural productivity; (3) inefficient infrastructure, (4) falling
reserves in foreign currency and raw materials; and (5) high consumption. See
Party's Decision on Further Managing, Reorganizing and Deepening Reform, in
1990 ANN. OF CHINA FOREIGN ECON. AFF. & TRADE 1, 1-13 (1991) (available in
Chinese).
32. Party's Decision on Further Managing, Reorganizing and Deepening
Reform, supra note 31.
33. Id.
34. According to the U.S. figure, in 1991 U.S. exports to China rose 30.8%
to $6.3 billion and U.S. imports from China rose 24.6% to $19 billion. OFF. OF
U.S. TRADE REP., 1992 NATIONAL TRADE EsrmATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRmIRs 44 (March 31, 1992).
35. See MOFERT Spokesman Talks about Sino-U.S. Trade Issues, 559
XINEUA MoNTHLy 157-59 (1991) (available in Chinese). The spokesman from
China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) asserts
that a large trade deficit is not necessarily a GATT violation, especially when
the statistical figure from one side is inconsistent with that of the other. See id.
36. For example, the difference between U.S. and Chinese figures for Chi-
nese imports into the United States for 1989 is $7.61 billion, and the Hong
Kong figure of transshipment from China to the United States is $8.45 billion.
Id. at 157. For 1990, the difference was $10.02 billion, and the Hong Kong fig-
ure for the same year was $10.47 billion. Id. The discrepancy between the U.S.
and Chinese figures is offset by the Hong Kong figure, indicating that the Hong
Kong transshipments are the cause. Id. Seventy percent of Chinese exports to
the United States are transshipped through Hong Kong. See Pryblya, supra
note 17.
37. China contends that for these raw materials processed in Hong Kong, it
earns only 7-8 percent of the production cost or the labor input plus the value of
the raw materials, resulting in no substantial export profit to China. See
MOFERT Spokesman Talks About Sino-U.S. Trade Issues, supra note 35, at
157.
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exported to the United States, contributing to China's export
surplus with the United States. 38
China also argued that economic sanctions (including a ban
on the export of high technology) imposed by the United States
and other western countries after June 1989 caused a decrease
in China's imports from the United States.39 Moreover, China
maintains that it has always emphasized Sino-U.S. trade rela-
tions and has never adopted or exercised any discriminatory pol-
icies. 40 Even after the U.S. announcement of economic
sanctions, China did not take any retaliatory measures. 4' China
nevertheless reasserted its efforts to increase U.S. trade by
sending large purchasing missions to the United States for im-
ports of technology and equipment. 42 China's position is consis-
tent with its long-standing view that the economic stakes in the
bilateral trade relationship are too large for either China or the
United States to forgo.
Due to the seeming seriousness of the deficit problem and
despite the probable discrepancies in statistics, the U.S. govern-
ment exercised its discretionary power under Section 301 in an
effort to improve market access in China.43 Although the prob-
lem of a trade imbalance has long been at issue, the United
States did not launch its 301 action until it perceived that China
was determined and prepared to conform with GATT. 44
38. As a result, the transferred production caused the exports from Hong
Kong and Taiwan to decline. Id. Furthermore, a new calculation of trade be-
tween the United States and the "Greater China" region (China, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan) shows that while the U.S trade deficit with China grew by 272
percent from 1987 to 1991 (U.S. figure), the U.S. deficit with Hong Kong and
Taiwan declined by 82 and 48 percent, respectively, during the same period.
Harry Harding, 19 CmNA Bus. REV. 18, 22 (May-June 1992). This resulted in a
net reduction of the deficit with the "Greater China" region of nearly 60 percent.
Id. This trend continued further in 1992. See generally Donald M. Anderson,
China Policy: Fostering U.S. Competitiveness and the Bilateral Relationship, 20
CHINA Bus. REv. 10, 12 (Jan.-Feb. 1993).
39. See MOFERT Spokesman Talks About Sino-U.S. Trade Issues, supra
note 35, at 157.
40. This contention conflicted with the United States' accusation that
China's State Council Directive No. 56 required the telecommunications au-
thority to sign contracts only with a group of three non-U.S. suppliers. See Jo-
seph Massey, 301: The Successful Resolution, 19 CHINA Bus. REV. 10 (1992).
41. See MOFERT Spokesman Talks About Sino-U.S. Trade Issues, supra
note 35, at 158.
42. Id. On this point, MOFERT stressed that all the "buying American"
efforts were prompted by China's sincere attitude toward promoting trade rela-
tions with the United States. Id.
43. See Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 27.
44. Id.
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B. PRINCIPLES VS. PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
China expressed strong disapproval of the 301 investigation
in principle, 45 but did not threaten any retaliatory measures in
response to the USTR's initiation of 301 action. China re-
sponded instead by inviting the U.S. trade negotiators to fur-
ther meetings on market access, to be held at the end of October,
1991 in Beijing. 46 In light of China's gesture, it was necessary
for the U.S. government to make some policy-balancing
decisions.
First, it must be understood that, in principle, China gener-
ally resists any foreign pressures concerning how it should pro-
ceed with its economic reform. China does, however, welcome
economic cooperation on level ground. On the one hand, the idea
that the United States plays a dominant role in China's eco-
nomic reform is hard for China to accept.4 7 China adamantly
rejected the idea that the 301 action would push China's trade
system reform toward international standards. 48 On the other
45. The USTR launched a Section 301 investigation into market access and
other issues relating to Chinese and U.S. trade in spite of China's attempt to
answer U.S. concerns with an unofficial document on market access. For de-
tails of the Chinese reaction to the unilateral action by the USTR, see China's
Strong Dissatisfaction over Section 301 Investigation, 34 BEIJrNG REV. 31-32
(1991). See also China Expresses Strong Dissatisfaction over U.S.' Section 301
Investigation, Xinhua General Overseas News Agency, Oct. 11, 1991, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Xinhua File.
46. Administration Initiates Investigation of China's Market Access Trade
Barriers, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1495 (Oct. 16, 1991).
47. Luo Rongqu warned that the United States should learn from past ex-
perience that it has always overestimated its influence on Chinese policy and
underestimated China's ability to choose its own policy. Luo Rongqu, Political
Choice in Changing World Climate: A Chinese Perspective toward the Sino- U.S.
Relationship, 150 BEInNG UNIV. J. (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition) 1,
3-4 (1992) (available in Chinese). Luo also points out that in dealing with
China, the United States should make a long-term political choice, rather than
a short-term policy choice. Id. The viewpoint of a U.S. businessman is also
worth noting:
The [Chinese] regime will seek to preserve its prestige and sovereignty
in the face of foreign demands. Chinese history amply demonstrates
that when Beijing has to choose between maintaining political control
and preserving foreign economic interests, it will always choose preser-
vation of the political regime. The 301 and Special 301 negotiations
were successful precisely because they were not political; Beijing did
not lose "face" in coming to an agreement with the United States be-
cause the agreements were cast within the larger economic framework
of making China's economy GATT-compatible.... [The] Chinese would
not want to be seen to "kowtow" (bow) to a foreign power.
Anderson, supra note 38, at 14.
48. Tong Zhiguang, Vice Minister of MOFERT, stated that China would
continue to align its trade regime with international standards, but not neces-
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hand, China has always viewed the United States as an impor-
tant trading partner and does not want to see bilateral trade
relations deteriorate. 49 The mutual interests of the two coun-
tries50 prompted the United States to avoid the strong negative
reaction of China to the 301 action that would have ensued if the
action was justified solely on the policy considerations of U.S.
trade law.5 1 Ultimately, the success of the 301 action depended
on whether or not the United States was fully aware of the po-
tential adverse effect of its action.52 The USTR eventually
avoided a direct confrontation with China by placing the trade
issues under GATT principles. 53 This strategy was not in con-
flict with China's goals, but, instead, was actually consistent
with China's overall reform policy. 54
sarily in the way that the United States expects it to - China would take its
own approach. Tong also stated that China's desire to enter GATT and willing-
ness to withstand GATT obligations remain firm even in the midst of market
access negotiations, and even if the negotiations do not succeed. MOFERT Vice
Minister Tong Zhiguang Held Press Conference on Sino-U.S. Market Access Ne-
gotiations, 576 YxNHUA MONTHLY 160-61 (1992) (available in Chinese).
49. A MOFERT official stated that China has always recognized the mutu-
ality of the Sino-U.S. economies, and that bilateral trade has great potential
because of mutual demands. See MOFERT Spokesman Talks About Sino-U.S.
Trade Issues, supra note 35, at 158.
50. The common economic interests between the United States and China
center on several different areas. For the Unites States, China means at least
100,000 jobs, many of which are in high-technology industries, $6 billion in an-
nual exports to China (1991 figure), consumer gains from low-priced China im-
ports, and future revenue to be generated from China's open market. See
Prybyla, supra note 17. For China, the United States is its single most impor-
tant customer (importing about 25 percent of China's exports in 1991), an im-
portant supplier of high technology, and a significant supporter of China's
standing in and admission to international economic organizations. Id.
51. See MOFERT Vice Minister Tong Zhiguang Held Press Conference on
Sino-U.S. Market Access Negotiations, supra note 48, at 160-61.
52. "W]hile the United States presses China to open its markets, we must
also be mindful that our policies will affect important constituencies within
China." Sands & Lehr, supra note 13, at 11.
53. During the negotiations, China informed the USTR that as a develop-
ing country China would not accept any concessions beyond what GATT re-
quires of developing countries. See MOFERT Vice-Minister Tong Zhiguang
Held Press Conference on Sino-U.S. Market Access Negotiations, supra note 48,
at 161. China urged the United States to adopt a flexible and practical strategy
so that an agreement could be reached. Id. The USTR also realized that
China's strong desire to accede to GATT made it more willing to open its mar-
kets. China's desire to join GATT is heightened because it wants to avoid being
shut out of GATT if Taiwan is accepted first. Massey, supra note 40, at 11.
54. China needs access to U.S. markets and technology, due to its continua-
tion and expansion of economic reforms. Id. at 9, 11. China took the market
access action seriously because if the United States carried out its sanctions,
China would lose access to U.S. markets and technology. Id.
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Second, China has taken the position that Section 301 as
amended by the 1988 Trade Act has strong protectionist tenden-
cies that are neither in line with the U.S. government's long-
term position on free trade nor representative of the spirit of a
global economy embodied in the policies of GATT.5 5 China has
specifically argued that while the United States threatens other
countries with unilateral trade sanctions under Section 301, the
United States requires other countries to abide by the rules of
GA'TT.56
China did, however, signal its sincere willingness to enter
into market access negotiations in furtherance of its continuing
reform policy, and expected the same degree of sincerity and
pragmatism from the United States. 57 For example, in response
to a proposed retaliation list put forth by the United States,
China announced its anti-retaliation proposal, but only with the
hope of ultimately reaching an agreement.58 Since the USTR
focused on resolving the issues under GATT principles in a man-
ner which would further China's involvement in the world econ-
omy, the argument that 301 actions are protectionist was not
stressed by China during the 301 negotiations.
Third, although China is not presently a member of GATT,
China's strong desire to re-enter GATT59 has allowed the United
55. Cable from American Embassy, Beijing, to Secretary of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., State Department No. FBIS 034 (Aug. 11, 1988). (PRC Govern-
ment Spokesman Criticizes U.S. Trade Bill). See also Wang Dingyong, On
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA 67, 77
(1993) (available in Chinese). For a discussion of criticism of the 1988 amend-
ments by foreign countries, see Kenneth J. Ashman, Note, The Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 - the Section 301 Amendments: Insignificant
Changes from Prior Law? 7 B. U. INrL L. J. 115 (1989).
56. MOFERT Vice Minister Tong Zhiguang Held Press Conference on Sino-
U.S. Market Access Negotiations, supra note 48, at 161.
57. Id. at 160.
58. The announcement of an anti-retaliation measure was China's official
response to the USTR's threatened sanctions on Chinese products. See supra
note 16 and accompanying text. Mr. Tong Zhiguang, Deputy Minister of
MOFERT, stated that "China is not afraid of trade war, especially when
threatened with unilateral trade retaliations." MOFERT Vice Minister Tong
Zhiguang Held Press Conference on Sino-U.S. Market Access Negotiations,
supra note 48, at 160-61. "In the event that the U.S. retaliates against China
with high tariffs, China will certainly take corresponding measures." Id. "That
is undoubted, but we do not wish to do so." Id. In addition, Tong stated that in
response to the USTR's retaliation list, the Chinese authority had proposed an
anti-retaliation list, for which public comment was being requested. Id.
59. China argues that the CONTRACTNG PARTIES should allow China to re-
sume China's original GAT membership rather than admit China as a new
member. See Cai, supra note 15. This position may complicate U.S. trade pol-
icy toward China when China joins GAT due to the conflict between the re-
142 [Vol. 3:131
1994] CHINA 301
States to resolve trade disputes with China under GATT princi-
ples. The USTR identified four issues that it would investigate
pursuant to Section 301: (1) transparency of trade laws, regula-
tions, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings; (2) selected
import prohibitions and quantitative restrictions; (3) import li-
censing requirements; and (4) selected technical standards and
testing requirements.60 The USTR considered these trade barri-
ers "to be inconsistent with the multilateral rules and trade lib-
eralization principles of"6 1 GATT and "to the multilateral codes
negotiated under GATT auspices, if [China] were a contracting
party to the GATT and its related codes."62 This approach even-
tually led the 301 negotiations in a direction which promoted
China's stated goal of joining GATT, 63 rather than simply
resolving trade issues to the benefit of the United States.
II. THE MOU IN GATT TERMS
The 301 action ended satisfactorily for both the United
States and China. The two countries successfully negotiated the
MOU on market access, one of the two "landmark trade agree-
ments."64 Because of the significant role of GATT principles in
the bilateral negotiations, it is worth examining how the MOU
provisions incorporated GATT terms in resolving the market ac-
cess issues.
quirements under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and U.S. obligations under
GATT. See Chang, supra note 17. In order to preserve the leverage of annual
MFN renewal under the Amendment, the United States may choose to opt out
of its GATr obligations to China under Article XXXV. Id. However, the United
States may not be able to invoke Article XXXV if China's GATT membership is
resumed because Article XXXV applies only when a new member becomes a
contracting party. Id.
60. See Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 27. For a detailed discussion of
these four issues and their relationship to relevant GATT provisions, see infra
notes 66-122 and accompanying text. In addition to investigating these four
issues, the USTR would continue to hold consultations with China to address
market access barriers that would not necessarily be inconsistent with GATT
rules but which nevertheless would pose significant impediments to trade, in-
cluding China's "prohibitively high" tariffs, some of which range from 120 to
170 percent ad valorem. See Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 27.
61. Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 27. "Resolution of these market ac-
cess issues is important for China in light of its expressed desire to join the
GATTI. Currently, China's trade regime is incompatible with GATT policies and
principles in many respects." OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 34 at 44.
For details of specific Chinese trade barriers, see infra notes 66-125 and accom-
panying text.
62. Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 27.
63. Id.
64. 1993 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 50. See also supra note 6.
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The Section 301 action on market access involved four spe-
cific trade issues: (1) lack of transparency of the Chinese trade
regime; (2) import prohibitions and restrictions; (3) import li-
censing requirements; and (4) technical and certification barri-
ers.65 The use of GATT rules facilitated the ultimate agreement
on these issues.
A. ABSENCE OF TRANSPARENCY
Absence of transparency has been a major obstacle to
China's foreign trading partners. The lack of transparency in
China's trading system lies in the fact that rules and regulations
governing the system are not readily accessible and vary by re-
gion. 66 Due to this lack of transparency, "U.S. firms and even
Chinese officials themselves lack a solid understanding of how
the Chinese trading system works."67 In addition to national
rules, China also maintains a set of internal (neibu) rules that
are unavailable to foreigners and may take precedence over any
known regulations. 68
The MOU has committed China to substantially improving
the transparency of its trade regime. 69 Compliance with Article
I of the MOU will bring China into conformity with GATT Arti-
cle X. GATT Article X covers the issue of transparency by re-
quiring each contracting party to promptly publish all of its
trade laws and regulations, as well as its bilateral trade agree-
ments, for the benefit of its trading partners. 70
65. See Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 27; Off. of U.S. Trade Rep.,
Termination of Section 301 Investigation Regarding Certain Market Access
Barriers of the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,889 (Oct. 20, 1992).
66. OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 34, at 52.
67. Id.
68. Id. "Virtually every foreigner who has tried to do business in China
has had an encounter with a bureaucrat who has explained that what the for-
eigner is seeking to do, or the approval he or she needs, is prohibited by an
internal (neibu) regulation the foreigner is not permitted to see." Massey,
supra note 40, at 9.
69. See MOU, supra note 6, art. I.
70. GATT art. X:1 states in relevant part:
Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of gen-
eral application, made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to
the classification or the valuation of products for customs purposes, or
to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions
or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments
therefor, or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance,
warehousing, inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use,
shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable govern-
ments and traders to become acquainted with them. Agreements af-
fecting international trade policy which are in force between the
[Vol. 3:131
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China has agreed first to publish, openly and promptly, all
laws, regulations and decrees concerning trade;71 second, to
establish a central repository for the publication of all trade reg-
ulations;72 third, to enforce only published trade laws, regula-
tions and administrative guidance, and end the use of restrictive
internal trade regulations;73 and fourth, to make the import ap-
proval process transparent.74 Implementation of these meas-
ures would bring China into conformity with GATT Article X
The third item appears to be a corrective measure requiring
China to internally regulate the transparency of its trade sys-
tem to bring about uniformity and consistency within the coun-
try. This is necessary to bring China into compliance with the
prohibition under Article X on the enforcement of any measure
affecting existing import duties or other restrictions before such
a measure has been published. 75 In addition, the MOU provides
for administrative and judicial procedures for processing cus-
toms-related complaints, including appeals to both administra-
tive and judicial authorities. 76
China's full implementation of the transparency require-
ments is a fundamental step in its overall trade system reform.
Effective implementation will ensure that China's market is
more open to the United States. 77 Realistically, however, due to
governmental bureaucracy, the transparency issue will not be
fully resolved without difficulty.
government or governmental agency of any other contracting party
shall also be published.
71. See MOU, supra note 6, art. I, 1.
72. Id. art. 1, 4 (requiring the designation of an official journal for the
publication required under this article).
73. Id. art. I, 4 (requiring the Chinese government to issue regulations
providing that only trade laws and regulations published and readily available
to foreign governments and traders can be enforced).
74. This commitment overlaps one of the agreements reached on the issue
of import licensing which requires China to publish a list of Chinese authorities
granting import licenses or other approval, and related procedures. Id. art. II,
1(ii).
75. GATf art. X:2 states:
No measure of general application taken by any contracting party ef-
fecting an advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under
an established and uniform practice, or imposing a new or more bur-
densome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the
transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced before such measure
has been officially published.
76. MOU, supra note 6, art. I, 6.
77. Massey, supra note 40, at 10.
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B. IMPoRT LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
China's control of imports is based largely on its import li-
censing system. By 1991, the system covered approximately 45
percent of China's imports by value, affecting a wide range of
products. As many as 572 categories of consumer goods, raw
materials, and production equipment were included. 78 The U.S.
government sees the Chinese import licensing system as a sig-
nificant barrier. First, an importer is often required to obtain
the approval of several government agencies before it can import
a specific product.79 The approval of the ministry that manages
the manufacture of the same products in the domestic market is
particularly important because the government seeks to avoid
potential competition with domestic products. 80 Second, the
centralized licensing approval system often overrides approval
by local governments. 81 Third, only Chinese companies can gen-
erally apply for import licenses, restricting direct market access
by foreign companies.8 2 Fourth, importation of many consumer
goods is restricted either because, as mentioned above, the gov-
ernment wants to protect alternative domestic goods, or because
the product for which permission is sought is considered incom-
patible with China's economic policies.8 3
The United States' major concern regarding China's import
licensing system is not its fundamental legitimacy, but rather
the wide scope of its coverage, the growing economic value of the
imports covered, and the lack of transparency in the system.
Under GATT, licensing is one of the import and export formali-
ties which is regulated so as not to result in "indirect protection
of domestic products."84 The extensive coverage of the Chinese
import licensing system makes it incompatible with GATT be-
78. Id. See OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 20, at 38; OFF. OF U.S.
TRADE REP., 1991 NATIONAL TRADE EsTImATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARIu-
ERS 45 (1991)[hereinafter 1991 NTE REPORT]; OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra
note 34, at 45.
79. Id.
80. In 1990, for example, the U.S. government perceived a reluctance by
Chinese industrial ministries to expand imports which would compete with the
domestic products under their management. See 1991 NTE REPORT, supra note
78, at 45.
81. See OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 34, at 45.
82. Id. See also 1993 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 53.
83. For example, the sharp decline of U.S. cigarette imports to China from
$140 million in 1988 to only $8.8 million in 1991 worried the U.S. government.
The decline occurred because the Chinese government considered cigarettes
wasteful and unnecessary consumer goods. See OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra
note 34, at 45.
84. GATT art. VIII:1.
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cause its purpose is to protect domestic industries. Its GATT-
incompatibility has therefore been the key aspect of the U.S. po-
sition that the breadth of the system must be significantly
reduced.85
The MOU brings China's import licensing system into com-
pliance with GATT Article VIII, which deals with, inter alia, im-
port formalities such as licensing.8 6 GATT Article VIII calls for
minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export
formalities and for decreasing and simplifying import and ex-
port documentation requirements, including licensing.8 7 The
MOU provisions minimize the number of imports for which
licenses are required, and limit the licensing rules to those is-
sued by the central government. The MOU, however, allows
China to prohibit imports when such prohibitions are covered by
the exceptions contained in GATT Articles XX and XXI.88
The resolution of the import licensing issue appears to have
eased a major concern of the United States.8 9 China agreed to
eliminate 75 percent of its import licensing requirements over
the following two years; the first set was to be eliminated by De-
cember 31, 1993.90 The MOU also requires that the remaining
import licensing requirements be transparent 9' and uniform, 92
and that China eliminate other burdensome requirements. 93
The USTR has recognized that the elimination of these restric-
tions will be of direct benefit to U.S. exporters. 94
85. OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 34, at 45-46.
86. GATT art. VIII:l(c) & 4(c).
87. Id.
88. See MOU, supra note 6, art. II, 2. Article XX of the GATT allows ten
general exceptions to a Contracting Party's GATT obligations. GATT art. XX.
Article XXI allows certain measures to be taken if they are necessary for the
national security interest of a Contracting Party. GATT art. XXI.
89. After the MOU is fully implemented, only five categories of goods (in-
cluding rubber products and wool) will be subject to licensing. Massey, supra
note 40, at 10. These products are of minor interest to the United States. Id.
90. For details of China's import licensing reduction plan, see MOU, supra
note 6, art. II, I 1(i) and ann. See also infra note 132 and accompanying text.
91. Id. art. II, I 1(ii) (requiring such rules be published within 90 days
from the signing of MOU).
92. Id. art. II, % l(iii)(requiring that only import regulations imposed by
the central government are enforceable).
93. Id. art. II, s 1(iv)(prohibiting conditioning issuance of import licenses
upon transfer of technology, meeting investment requirements in China, or
whether competing domestic suppliers of such products exist).
94. 1993 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 53.
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C. IMPORT PROHIBITIONS AND QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
China's import restriction measures have been identified as
barriers to U.S. exports.95 Due to the centralized control over
imports, all major import decisions in China are generally made
according to state plan; the planning results in mandatory
guidelines set for specific import categories while excluding
other import categories not covered by the plan.96 Chinese im-
port restrictions were adopted to "prevent the expenditure of for-
eign exchange on nonpriority items and to protect domestic
producers against competitive foreign products."97 In the 301
negotiations, the USTR focused more on the economic impact of
the restrictions on segments of U.S. industry, such as timber
and steel.98
The MOU provisions on quantitative restrictions of imports
will bring China into compliance with GATT Articles XI, XII,
and XIII. Article XI requires the general elimination of quanti-
tative restrictions,99 and, pursuant to the MOU, Chinese quotas
on a majority of the product categories will be eliminated. Arti-
cle XII, as an exception to Article XI, allows import restrictions
as a safeguard to balance of payments. 00 This provision applies
to China because it is still a developing country in need of steady
foreign reserves.' 0 1 Article XIII calls for the non-discriminatory
administration of any quantitative restrictions.
10 2
Under the MOU, China agreed to phase out most of its im-
port restrictions within five years following the signing of the
95. See Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 27.
96. For example, import prohibitions covered approximately 80 types of
products and materials, mostly consumer goods, in both 1989 and 1990. As a
result, computer hardware, television sets, electronic components, VCRs, cer-
tain production assembly line products, printed circuit boards, and fiber option
cables were banned in 1989. Further import restrictions were implemented in
1990 to cover building materials, resulting in 66 percent reduction of wood im-
ports and 84 percent reduction of steel imports from the U.S. See OFF. OF U.S.
TRADE REP., supra note 20, at 39; 1991 NTE REPORT, supra note 78, at 45; OFF.
OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 34, at 46.
97. OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 34, at 45.
98. 1993 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 53.
99. GAT art. XI:.
100. GATT art. XII.
101. GATT Article XII allows import restrictions that are necessary 'in the
case of a contracting party with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a rea-
sonable rate of increase in its reserves." GATT art. XII:2(a)(ii).
102. GATT art. XIII:, 2(c).
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MOU. 10 3 After full implementation, only thirty one categories
will remain subject to import bans, compared to 234 categories
that were subject to import bans prior to the signing of the
MOU.10 4 Categories of import quotas will also be reduced from
fifty-two to ten, most of which will not significantly affect U.S.
exports to China. 10 5 The immediate effect of this part of the
MOU is: (1) the elimination of approximately 75 percent of all
forms of import restrictions by the end of 1994, including tele-
communications equipment and instant cameras and films;' 08
(2) the significant liberalization of quantitative restrictions on
the product categories each year until full elimination is
achieved according to schedule; 10 7 and (3) the elimination of the
discriminatory Directive 56 requiring contracts with only three
non-U.S. digital equipment suppliers.'0 8
D. TECHNICAL AND CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
The United States has considered Chinese quality stan-
dards on foreign goods as "stringent and excessive" barriers' 0 9
because they are unknown to foreign exporters and not required
of domestic goods. 110 China generally requires a quality license
103. China will eliminate its import restrictions according to the schedule
set forth in the Annex of the MOU. See MOU, supra note 6, art. II 1(i) and
ann.
104. Id. See also Massey, supra note 40, at 10.
105. Id. According to Massey, some categories of U.S. autos and auto parts
will still face quantitative restraints (QRs). However, the remaining QRs will
not affect the auto parts used by U.S.-China auto joint ventures in China. Since
this part of the agreement benefits only the United States and China, Massey
predicted that Japan and European countries would criticize it. Id.
106. Id.
107. MOU, supra note 6, art. II, 1(i).
108. China State Council's Directive 56 forbade purchases of certain high
technology from U.S. suppliers. According to the USTR, China State Council's
Directive 56 required provincial governments to purchase telecommunication
equipment from only three non-U.S. suppliers. Administration Initiates Inves-
tigation of China's Market Access Trade Barriers, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1495
(Oct. 16, 1991). The MOU requires China to act by March 31, 1993 to ensure
that China's procurement of digital switching systems is conducted within in-
ternational procedures and on a nondiscriminatory basis as to the source of
equipment or identity of the buyer. MOU, supra note 6, art. II, 1(v). The
USTR sees this provision as a de facto rescission of Directive 56. Massey, supra
note 40, at 10.
109. 1991 NTE REPORT, supra note 78, at 46.
110. For a detailed description of the operation and economic effects of
China's inspection system, see Ari ben Avraham, Inspection Turf Wars, 20
CHINA Bus. Rxv. 48 (1993). Avraham believes that both foreign and Chinese
companies stand to suffer from an intensifying feud within China's inspection
bureaucracy, and that it is the Chinese economy that will suffer the most. Id.
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to be issued on certain goods before their importation into
China, which can cause long delay and additional expenses."'
Such importation quality control and testing practices are con-
sidered protective measures for domestic producers because they
delay or discourage entrance of foreign goods, thereby increasing
the cost of U.S. imports. 1 12
The MOU brings China's technical and certification require-
ments into general conformity with GATT. Under GATT Article
VIII, import inspection, sanitation, and certification are consid-
ered formalities that shall be minimized and simplified.11 It
also calls for contracting parties to review the operation of their
laws and regulations so that they comply with the standards of
the article.114 In addition, the 1979 GATT Standards Code" x5
prohibits any GATT member from utilizing "technical regula-
111. The following import quality control measures have been identified by
the USTR:
(1) From 1989 to 1991 China's State Administration of Import ad
Export Commodity Inspection (SACI) required inspection of a wide va-
riety of import commodities as well as export items. See OFF. OF U.S.
TRADE REP., supra note 20, at 39; 1991 NTE REPORT, supra note 78, at
46; OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 34, at 47.
(2) China still applies strict phytosanitary and veterinary import
quarantine standards not supported by modem laboratory techniques.
For example, it bans all imports of U.S. fresh fruits into China because
of the Mediterranean fruit fly infestations in Los Angeles. See 1991
NTE REPORT, supra note 78, at 46; OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra
note 34, at 47; 1993 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 54.
(3) Since May 1990, China has required quality import licenses for
nine machinery and electronics products (automobiles, motorcycles
and engines, refrigerators, refrigerator compressors, air conditioners
and compressors, TV sets, and kinescopes). OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP.,
supra note 34, at 47. In the case of autos, exporters must provide two
free samples and $40,000 for testing, and finance inspection of foreign
auto plants by Chinese inspectors. See OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP,,supra
note 20, at 39; 1991 NTE REPORT, supra note 78, at 46; OFF. OF U.S.
TRADE REP., supra note 34, at 47; 1993 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at
54.
(4) China continues to require costly testing procedures for foreign
pesticides, which do not apply to domestic pesticides. See 1993 NTE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 54.
112. Such prohibitive effect on trade results largely from the wide coverage
of China's certification system. One estimate shows that the number of prod-
ucts subject to standards testing certification requirements increased by 30 per-
cent from 1988 to 1992, covering nearly 150 categories of imports. See Massey,
supra note 40, at 10.
113. GAIT art. VIII:l(c), 4(f), 4(g), & 4(h).
114. GATT art. VIII:2.
115. GATT, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD 26th Supp. 11
(1980).
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tions or standards" to create "unnecessary obstacles to interna-
tional trade."116
Compared with the other three issues, the issue of stan-
dards and certification requirements between the United States
and China has only been resolved to a limited extent. 117 China
agreed to apply the requirements to both foreign and domestic
non-agricultural products, 118 and to gradually harmonize
phytosanitary and veterinary restrictions. 119 China also prom-
ised to adopt mutually-agreed-upon principles of sound science
to handle the import of U.S. animal genetic materials, 120 to re-
strain from applying conservation policies of domestic wood
products to the same imports,121 and to publish any changes or
additions to sanitary and phytosanitary testing or certification
requirements before implementation. 122 Thus, implementation
of the MOU would bring China's import certification system
closer to GATT standards, but further improvement must be
made.
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOU
A. IMPLEMENTATION
The MOU, when fully implemented, will give "unprece-
dented market access for key U.S. exports to China."123 There-
fore, China's progress in implementing the MOU is of immediate
importance to the United States. As initial steps in furtherance
of the MOU, China has made a public commitment to continuing
reform of its trade regime, particularly concerning imports, in
order to aid its bid to re-enter GATT. 124 It further promised a
gradual move towards using tariffs as its main economic levers,
and to adopt an international standard of calculating its foreign
reserves.' 25 In addition, China announced that import substitu-
116. Id. art. 7.1.
117. See 1993 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 54.
118. MOU, supra note 6, art. IV. 2.
119. Id. art IV, 2 & 3.
120. Id. art. IV, 3.
121. Id. art. V, 4.
122. Id. art. IV, 5.
123. Henrik Hansen, China Agrees to Increase Market Access for U.S. Ex-
ports, E. AsLIN EXEC. REP. 16 (Oct. 15, 1992) available in LEXIS, ITRADE Li-
brary, EASIAN File.
124. In a press conference on January 20, 1993, MOFERT spokesman Zhou
Jie announced the reform plan. See China Launches Trade Reforms to Regain
Membership in GATT, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 135 (Jan. 27, 1993).
125. Some see the move of devaluation of foreign reserves as designed to
protect Chinese industry while import barriers are reduced. Id. On a broader
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tion had been eliminated, and legislation to implement the
transparency of trade regulations was being considered. China
also proclaimed that several important measures were being im-
plemented, including steps to end export subsidies, phase-out li-
censing requirements, and lower import taxes. 126 China also
released a list of 210 major capital construction projects ex-
pected to require imports worth $30 billion in this century. 127
Most importantly, China has fulfilled its obligations for the first
phase-out period of the MOU by eliminating quotas and import
licenses on 283 products and by lowering tariffs on 234
products. 128
The United States, however, has remained skeptical about
the sufficiency of China's progress toward implementing the
MOU.129 Shortly after the MOU was signed, "cautious celebra-
tion" was called for, because the potential positive impact of the
agreement would depend on how seriously China implements its
level, China announced in December 1992 that it would institute market re-
forms to build a "socialist market economic system." U.S. Wheat Exports to
China Fell by 1 Million Tons in 1992, USDA Says, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA)
1357 (Aug. 18, 1993). "Premier Li Peng said China would be willing to trans-
form the functions of government, change the way enterprises operate, promote
the development of markets, implement price reforms, improve the information
system to report market conditions and to forecast supply and demand condi-
tions, and establish a legal system to support the market system." Id.
126. China Moving to End Export Subsidies, Lower Import Taxes, Chinese
Official Says, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 949 (June 9, 1993).
127. The announcement was made just ahead of the USTR's visit to inspect
China's progress towards improving market access. China Issues List of Con-
struction Projects Expected to Require $30 Billion in Imports, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1018 (June 23, 1993).
128. PEoPLE's DAILy, Jan. 1, 1994 at 2 (available in Chinese).
129. Despite China's promises pursuant to the market access MOU, the
USTR was still "watching it very closely" and was concerned about trade
problems with China, expecting possible non-implementing or backsliding.
U.S. 'Concerned' over China's Compliance with 301 Pact, Official Says, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 476 (Mar. 17, 1993). This concern resulted in a three-day
bilateral meeting (April 21-23, 1993) on implementing the MOU, where the
United States expressed its dissatisfaction with China's progress toward the
transparency of its trade regulations. U.S., China Conclude Round of Talks on
Implementation of Market Access Pact, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 711 (Apr. 28,
1993).
In a recent statement, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Bar-
shefsky said that the United States had "a number of substantial concerns"
over the implementation of the market access MOU considering that the United
States is the market for almost one-third of Chinese exports and will soon have
a $23 billion trade deficit with China. U.S. Gives China Until End of Year to
Prove Adherence to Market Access Pact, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1795 (Oct. 27,
1993). Barshefsky further stated that for the bilateral relationship to be a sub-
stantial one, China must open its markets. Id.
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terms. 130 Due to the transitional nature of the MOU terms, im-
plementation will not be completed until 1995; in the interim,
the increasing trade imbalance may still worry the U.S. govern-
ment.' 31 On the other hand, China's efforts to implement the
MOU have been positive, consistent with its ultimate goal of
reentering GATT. 132 Further improvements, however, must be
made in the near future in order for China to convince the
United States that substantial progress has been made.' 33
B. THE MOU AS A MODEL FOR A CHINA-GATT RELATIONSHIP
If fully implemented, the MOU will likely facilitate China's
entry into GATT. Full implementation of the MOU, however,
does not mean that all future trade issues can be resolved effi-
ciently once China joins the GATT but before it fully converts to
a market economy. The United States will likely continue to
bring 301 actions against China as it currently does against
other GATT members.' 34 However, China's willingness to ac-
130. Massey, supra note 40, at 9.
131. First, some were concerned about the implementing process of the
MOU:
China's fulfillment of the market access MOU has been more problem-
atic. The agreement is now only eight month old, but even so, some
disturbing signs are emerging. China's powerful planning establish-
ment, still alive and well despite the regime's commitment to build a
'socialist market economy,' shows signs of resisting fulfillment of com-
mitments made under the memorandum.
Sands & Lehr, supra note 13, at 12. In addition, a CIA report released on July
30 predicted a 30% growth of the trade deficit with China in 1993, to between
$23 and 24 billion. Further increases are likely over the next few years. The
report urged U.S. lawmakers to threaten U.S. retaliation. U.S. Trade Deficit
with China Could Jump by Nearly One-Third This Year, CIA Says, 10 Intl
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1276 (Aug. 4, 1993).
132. President Clinton and China's president Jiang Zemin met on Novem-
ber 19, 1993, at the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Seattle, em-
phasizing among other things, the market access issues. As of the December
31, 1993, deadline for the first major phasing-out period of China's trade barri-
ers identified in the MOU, China has abolished quotas and import licenses on
283 products and reduced tariffs for 234 products. China Lifts Some Import
Barriers, But Strengthens Limits on Other Imports, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 4
(Jan. 5, 1994).
133. Because of concern that the MOU is "not being adhered to" by China,
the USTR has not eliminated the possibility of another Section 301 investiga-
tion in case of non-compliance with the current MOU. U.S. Gives China Until
End of Year to Prove Adherence to Market Access Pact, 10 Intl Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1795 (Oct. 27, 1993).
134. A report of the House Ways and Means Committee took the position
that "it is essential for the United States to be able to act unilaterally in any
situation where it is unable to obtain redress through the GATT against prac-
tices which discriminate against or unreasonably impair U.S. export opportuni-
154 MwNv. J Gzoa, TRADE [Vol. 3:131
cept unilateral trade actions from the United States will dimin-
ish once it becomes a full GATT member.135
In theory, the support promised by the United States for
China's reentry into GATT should pave a path for the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES to work constructively with China on the
terms of its accession to GATT. The MOU is capable of serving
as a "working draft" of the GATT protocol for China's member-
ship. China's dual status as a developing country and a non-
market economy will continue to cause uncertainties and diffi-
culties beyond commercial expectations. Therefore, a dispute
settlement mechanism modeled after the China 301 approach
can serve as a secondary track, supplementing the primary dis-
pute settlement track that operates among GATT members. 136
ties." TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973, REPORT OF COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS;
H.R. REP. No. 571, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. at 67 (1973). Moreover, the standards
for commencing a dispute-settlement procedure are interchangeable between
Section 301 and GATT because when enacting the original Section 301, the defi-
nitions of "unjustifiable" and "unreasonable" as the statutory standards were
closely parallel to "nullification and impairment" standards under GATr. Rob-
ert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The
New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REv.
461, 515-522 (1975). In the case of Japan, the 301 mechanism outside GA'I'
effectuated several bilateral trade agreements which supposedly solved dis-
puted issues. For details of Japan 301 actions, see Grier, supra note 8. During
1989-1991, several trade agreements between the United States and Japan
were negotiated under a variety of 301 actions, including three "Super 301"
agreements and three "Telecommunication 301" agreements. Id.
135. The underlying momentum behind the successful conclusion of the 301
action will vanish after China joins the GATT simply because the concern over
losing U.S. support for its GATT bid will no longer be present. China expects
that its GATT member status will divert or ward off threats of unilateral trade
actions by resorting to GATT for "convenient and equitable" resolution of trade
disputes. See Wang, supra note 55, at 79. Moreover, GATT's multilateral fo-
rum will provide China with a better framework in which to defend against
protectionism and discrimination from any developed country. HAROLD K
JACOBSON AND MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF, THE
WORLD BANK, AND GATT 92 (1990). Finally, GATT will provide China with un-
conditional MFN status with all contracting parties so that China will be able
to deal with the United States without facing the uncertainty of an annual
MFN renewal battle within the U.S. government. China has argued that after
it enters GATT, the United States, under GATT Article I, should automatically
grant the MFN status to China and abandon the current practice of annual
presidential renewal. China and U.S. Remain Far Apart in China's GATT Re-
entry Talks, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 363 (Mar. 3, 1993).
136. For further discussion of this two-track system, see JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND PoLcy OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 291 (1989). The recent negotiations on China's membership indi-
cated that GATT would have to create a constructive protocol which safeguards
the GATT members while giving realistic flexibility for China to further its re-
form. Id. The Chinese position is that such a safeguard mechanism as re-
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This will ease tension between China and other GATT members
through constructive and flexible consultations and
negotiations.
In practice, for a two-track system to work properly, the pro-
tocol must provide for a dispute settlement mechanism on equal
terms, so that it will benefit not only the United States and
other developed countries, but China as well. Under the secon-
dary track, GATT members should be allowed to address griev-
ances directly with China and to impose trade sanctions when
necessary. However, China must be provided with the means to
respond to the possible impairments that it will face. Thus, it is
absolutely essential that the secondary track provide for bilat-
eral consultations and negotiations on equal terms before any
retaliatory action can be taken. 137 The 301 negotiations which
led to the market access MOU can provide a working model for a
China-GATT dispute settlement procedure.
CONCLUSION
The application of Section 301 to China has proven to be
effective. The USTR achieved a positive result by accommodat-
ing China's willingness to be bound under GATT principles
while addressing U.S. trade concerns with China. The two coun-
tries reached the market access MOU based on pragmatic con-
siderations, thereby avoiding further conflict in principle.
Because of the underlying momentum of GATT behind the
301 process, the provisions of the MOU demonstrate the signifi-
cance of GATT terms in facilitating both short-term and long-
term interests of the United States and China. To the satisfac-
tion of both countries, the resolution of the market access issues
was compatible with relevant GATT principles. Depending on
quested by the United States and the European Community would allow those
countries to protect their markets with unilateral quotas and tariffs against
Chinese export surges until China completes its transformation to a market
economy. See Talks on China's GATT Membership End; Questions Raised on
Currency Proposal, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 490 (Mar. 24, 1993). Thus, it is
necessary for this two-track system to provide special safeguards against possi-
ble surges of imports of Chinese products until China fully converts to a market
economy.
137. China has expressed concern that the safeguard mechanism being con-
templated by the GATT working party may work unequally because it would
allow the United States and EC to protect their markets with unilateral quotas
and tariffs against Chinese export surges until China completes its transforma-
tion to a market economy. Talks on China's GATT Membership End; Questions
Raised on Currency Proposal, supra note 136, at 490.
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the quality of the implementation, the MOU may become a prel-
ude to China's GATT membership.
The significance of the MOU extends further to the future
China-GATT relationship. Since the full implementation of the
MOU will not resolve all of the issues in China's trade regime,
the MOU should serve as a model for a constructive GATT proto-
col on China's accession. This protocol should contain a 301-like
dispute settlement mechanism which can serve as a secondary
track to the primary GATT dispute settlement procedure so that
issues arising from China's current non-market and developing
economy can be resolved efficiently. This two-track system must
operate on equal terms so that it benefits both China and the
other GATT members.
APPENDIX - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
JULY 19, 1991 - PRESIDENT BusH'S LETTER TO SENATOR
BAUCUS
Addressing the concerns over the U.S. - China trade imbal-
ance, President Bush, in his letter to Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT),
promised 301 action if the negotiations "fail to yield substantial
commitments from the Chinese authorities to dismantle market
access barriers." The President's Letter, 70 CONG. DIG. 228-229,
no. 10 (Oct. 1991). See also Senate Approves Conditional Exten-
sion of MFN Status for China Until Next Year, 8 Intl Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1102 (Jul. 24, 1991).
AUGUST 14, 1991 - USTR's PROPOSAL AND THREAT OF 301
ACTION
Pursuant to the spirit of the Bush letter, the USTR's office
stated on August 14, 1991 that in the "bilateral trade talks to be
held with China [that] week, the United States [would] seek spe-
cific market access commitments and possibly timetables for im-
provements in the key areas of transparency, import licensing
requirements, and use of import substitution policies." See U.S.
to Seek Specific Market Access Commitment on Trade Talks With
China, 8 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1236 (Aug. 21, 1991). These
were the first three issues that the United States identified. An
unidentified trade official recognized that the issue of trans-
parency in China's trade rules and regulations was fundamental
because of "China's Kafkaesque bureaucracy and long lists of
unpublished internal regulations". Id. The United States would
also seek to remove or reduce China's import licensing require-
[Vol. 3:131
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ments which covered 45 percent of imports by value, as well as
China's import substitute policy, which tightly restricts or bans
imports if an acceptable domestic substitute is available. Id.
The United States also stated that failure to produce substantial
progress on market access would result in self-initiated action
by the USTR against China under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade
Act. Id.
AUGUST 20, 1991 - PRELIMINARY TALKS STARTED
The bilateral talks from August 20 - 23, 1991, yielded only
vague commitments from the Chinese. In response, the United
States indicated that China would have until September 30,
1991 either to respond to the United States proposal or to come
up with its counter-proposal, and threatened China with formal
301 investigation in the event that it did not provide an author-
ized reply. Talks were conducted in Washington with the Chi-
nese delegation led by Tong Zhiguang, Vice Minister of the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT).
See U.S. Threatens 301 Action Against China After Talks Fail to
Produce Commitments, 8 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1284 (Aug. 28,
1991). The USTR indicated that after September 30, 1991 it
would initiate "an investigation of China's alleged unfair trade
practices if China [did] not formally respond to a United States
proposal for specific steps and timetables [for removing] market
access barriers." Id. The United States "asked China to give a
formal, authorized reply by Sept. 30 [1991] to a four-page U.S.
proposal for specific steps and timetables that China could take
to open up [its] market to foreigners, including increased trans-
parency, import substitution, and import licensing. Id. Addi-
tionally, in the event that China could not take the proposed
steps, the United States wanted to see any counter proposals
that China had. Id.
SEPTEMBER 30, 1991 - CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE U.S.
PROPOSAL
The Chinese proposal offered to reduce tariffs on a number
of product categories without providing details as to the depth of
the cuts or specifying which products would be included. See
Administration Initiates Investigation of China's Market Access
Trade Barriers, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1495 (Oct. 16, 1991).
China also indicated that it would consider eliminating the im-
port regulatory tax within six months. Id. With respect to im-
port licensing, China promised to announce the elimination of a
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"batch" of product categories requiring approval for import li-
censing and would strive over the next three years to reduce by
two-thirds the number of categories that required licenses. Id.
It also promised to gradually reduce the range of products sub-
ject to an import ban, without specifically addressing the U.S.
request for removal of a State Council's policy requiring provin-
cial governments to purchase digital telecommunications
switching equipment from only three non-U.S. suppliers. Id. Fi-
nally, China acknowledged its maintenance of internal, unpub-
lished trade regulations, and offered to compile and publish
trade documents and regulations in six months, and within a
year, compile laws, provisions, and regulations promulgated
since 1979. Id.
OCTOBER 10, 1991 - USTR's INITIATION OF 301 ACTION
Unsatisfied with the last-minute Chinese proposal, the
USTR initiated a formal Section 301 investigation, focusing on
the barriers to major U.S. exports to China. See Off. of U.S.
Trade Rep., Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request
for Public Comment: Barriers to Access to the Market of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,943 (1991). The USTR
specifically regarded these barriers as inconsistent with GATT's
multilateral trade rules and trade liberalization principles, all of
which would apply if China was to become a member. Id. The
USTR also requested consultation with the Chinese government
concerning the issues under investigation. Id. Section 303(a) of
the 1974 Trade Act authorizes consultation with a foreign gov-
ernment upon initiation of a 301 investigation. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 2413(a) (1988).
The USTR launched a Section 301 action against China as
authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1988). The purpose of the in-
vestigation was to determine whether or not specific market ac-
cess barriers in China were unreasonable or discriminatory and
whether they burdened or restricted U.S. commerce. Although
these matters did not trigger mandatory actions, the USTR con-
sidered them unfair and inequitable and, thus, as actionable
under the USTR's discretionary authority. Off. of U.S. Trade
Rep., Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for
Public Comment: Barriers to Access to the Market of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,943 (Oct. 16, 1991).
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FEBRUARY 25, 1992 - ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS STARTED
The negotiations focused on the four major types of barriers
identified in the section 301 action. In the interim, the USTR
requested public comment on the issues being investigated. See
Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., Request for Public Comment: People's
Republic of China: Market Access Barriers, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,520
(1992). Additionally, the USTR stated on April 2, 1992, that
there was little progress in the last three days of negotiations
between the United States and China in Washington, D.C. See
Little Progress Made in U.S. -China Market Access Talks, Massey
Says, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 635 (Apr. 8, 1992).
MAY 22, 1992 - "BUILDING BLOCKS" FOR A TRADE AGREEMENT
SECURED
By the end of the eighth round of negotiations on May 22,
1992, which was in many respects the most constructive and
productive, Joseph Massey, Assistant U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, was content that "building blocks" for an agreement on
market access had been secured. 'Building Blocks' Secured in
Talks with China on Market Access, Massey Says, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 928 (May 27, 1992). However, according to Massey,
substantial differences remained. Id.
JULY 8, 1992 - USTR's DEMAND FOR RESOLUTION BY MID-
AUGUST
Carla Hills, then U.S. Trade Representative, gave China a
list of issues that would have to be resolved by the end of a mid-
August meeting, or the United States would "publish a list of
products that could be eligible for sanctions." See USTR Hills
Gives China August Deadline, Is Prepared to Publish Retaliatory
List, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1294 (July 22, 1992).
AUGUST 27, 1992 - USTR's PUBLICATION OF RETALIATION LIST
The United States and China failed to resolve the issues by
the appointed mid-August deadline. Thus, the USTR published
a proposed list of nearly $4 billion worth of Chinese goods that
would be subject to punitive duties after the ultimate October
10, 1992 deadline. See Office of U.S. Trade Rep., Proposed De-
terminations Regarding Certain Market Access Barriers of the
People's Republic of China: Request for Public Comment and
Public Hearing, 57 Fed. Reg. 38,912 and ann. (1992).
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OCTOBER 10, 1992 - SIGNING OF THE MOU AND TERMINATION
OF 301 ACTION
After the mid-September working level negotiations and the
ninth and final round of negotiations with high-level Chinese
government officials, the United States and China reached a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU, signed on
the deadline date of October 10, 1992, was a broad ranging trade
agreement which would increase U.S. access to the Chinese
market. The signing of the MOU averted the threatened sanc-
tions. See People's Republic of China-United States: Memoran-
dum of Understanding Concerning Market Access, Oct. 10,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 1274 (1992).
The USTR officially terminated its 301 action on issues of
market access, ending the investigation on October 10, 1992.
See Office of U.S. Trade Rep, Termination of Section 301 Investi-
gation Regarding Certain Market Access Barriers of the People's
Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,889 (1992).
